

Executive Committee Meeting Summary
“JFCOM and M&S in Hampton Roads: Opportunity in Crisis”
August 20, 2010
at Town Point Club, Norfolk VA



Hampton Roads, America's First Region

Special Briefing on JFCOM by Hampton Roads Military and Federal Facilities Alliance Executive Director, Frank Roberts

Considering the recent announcement by Defense Secretary Gates to eliminate the U.S. Joint Forces Command, discussion revolved around the functions of JFCOM, the implications and impacts to the region of losing this command and its connections to other commands and how the region is organizing to respond. Since the announcement, numerous meetings have been held by our federal, state and local elected leaders, some of which have been reported in the newspapers.

As point of background: from 1996 to 2006, after retiring from the Navy and prior to becoming HRMFFA's Executive Director, Frank Roberts worked in both a contractor and government service employee role for the Joint Warfighting Center directly involved with and supporting JFCOM.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been working on Pentagon reforms for two years prior to his **8-9-10** announcement recommending the closure of JFCOM and the purported reallocation of those resources; this announcement was not about reducing the Department of Defense (DoD) budget but reducing excess overhead costs and applying savings to force structure and modernization.

Gates' current and planned base budgets have a modest but steady growth, i.e., minimum level of spending, planned at about 1-2% per year. Gates says Congress cannot be expected to approve budget increases unless everything possible is done to make every dollar count, and additional major changes are needed to meet President Obama's reform agenda

Gates conclusion: headquarters and support bureaucracies have swelled to cumbersome proportions, are too contractor dependent and operating without cost consideration. Gates has authorized military departments to consider consolidation or closure of excess bases and facilities.

Note: The President must deliver his next budget on the first Tuesday in February, i.e. Feb 2011 for FY12. This budget initiative is to improve efficiency and reduce costs in contracting.

Gates issued a Tasking memorandum on 8-16-10 to work through his recommendations; due back to him on December 14th. In the meantime, Gates concluded there are a number of areas where action can be taken now and not to wait for normal program and budget process. The initial set of decisions is aimed at reducing duplication, overhead and excess in defense enterprise. Department-wide efficiency and savings campaign are to be incorporated into FY12 budget request.

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Issues

1. Growth of service support/advisory contractors since 2000 from 26% to 39% of DoD workforce; not satisfied with progress to reduce over-reliance on contractors
Action: Reduce funding for service support contractors (not manufacturing and acquisition) by 10% per year for next three years; with 12,500 contractors in Hampton Roads, in straight numbers that amounts to 3,750 jobs impacted.
- ★ 2. Dramatic growth in size and expense of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense Agencies and Combatant Command (COCOM) staffs
Action: Freeze number of OSD, Defense Agencies and COCOM staffs at 2010 levels; re-baseline staffing & organization study (due by Nov 15)
3. Proliferation of new staff and more layers of bureaucracy
Action: Create system of fewer, flatter and more agile and responsive structures;
- ★ 4. Too many decentralized IT structures
Action: Consolidate assets to take advantage of economies of scale
5. Too many reports and studies
Action: Freeze DOD required oversight reports; cut 25% of funds for advisory studies; track and publish cost of every report
6. Number of outside boards and commissions
Action: Review and eliminate those no longer needed, focus on relevancy, cut funding by 25% in FY 11
7. New intelligence organizations and operations since 9/11 (of which JFCOM has a large intelligence structure)
Action: Directing immediate 10% reduction in funding for intelligence advisory & assistance contracts; freezing number of senior civilians; developing economies in support activities
8. Significant growth of new offices and organizations
Action: Eliminate Networks & Information Integration (in OSD) and the equivalent J6 (Command, Control, Communications & Computer Systems within Joint Chiefs of Staff) and assign functions to other organizations; eliminate Business Transformation Agency; **close US Joint Forces Command, assign force management functions to Joint Staff, evaluate other functions, reassign essential ones to other entities**

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JFCOM Background

- One of Department of Defense's ten combatant commands.
- Traces origins back to National Security Act of 1947 when Dept. of War became today's DoD.
- Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 formalized the joint warfighting concept and how combatant commands interacted
- DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the first real jointness test and lessons learned drove Congress to push for a single COCOM to improve joint warfighting (including allied integration and interagency involvement).
- Formed in 1999 when US Atlantic Command was renamed and given a new mission to transform the U.S. military through experimentation and education.
- JFCOM assumed the role of primary force (i.e. soldiers, sailors, marines and equipment) provider in 2004, a landmark change that assigned nearly all U.S. conventional forces (CONUS) to Joint Forces Command.

JFCOM Mission (unique among all 10 combatant commands)

- Provide ready, capable joint forces and support the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs.
- Anticipate and prepare for the future demands of the National Defense Strategy.
- *Only command whose mission is to leverage joint capabilities of U.S. military.*

JFCOM's Transformation Roles

1. Joint Concept Development & Experimentation at the joint task level
2. Joint Training, not at the basic military service level but one step up to include virtual exercises
3. Joint Capabilities Development, to include the responsibility architecture, but not to include articulation of monies required which resides with the forces themselves, i.e., Navy, Air Force, etc.
4. Joint Force Provider as primary conventional force provider, as outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) approved by the President. (Note: conventional forces sourcing and deployment was done by Joint Chiefs of Staff before JFCOM was formed; Special Operations Command (SOCOM) does have their own budgeting process unlike JFCOM. All commands, other than SOCOM, are supported financially by one of the military services. JFCOM money is almost exclusively in the Navy budget.)

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Operating Budget & Staffing Complement

Operating Budget (salaries for mil & civ)	\$703,954,000
Military	1491* (Hampton Roads 926)
Civilian	1533* (Hampton Roads 1,505)
Contractor	3,300 (Hampton Roads 3,216)
Combined Total (including contractors)	6,324 (Hampton Roads 5,647)

*Manning figures includes geographically separated units/subordinate components and Reserves.

Command Laydown *(see attached slides)*

- Norfolk (40%)
 - Command HQ (money was appropriated about 2 years ago for the new building currently under construction; temporary HQ is in Suffolk)
 - J1-Manpower and Personnel Directorate
 - J2-Intelligence Directorate and Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) develops, integrates, trains and provides joint intelligence capabilities to meet present and future needs of joint forces
 - J3/4-Operations, Plans, Logistics and Engineering Directorate
 - J5-Strategy and Policy Directorate
 - J6-Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate
 - J8-Joint Capability Development Directorate
 - JIWC-Joint Irregular Warfare Center to ensure success in the full spectrum of operations of today and the future
- North Suffolk (60%)
 - J7-Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center trains forces, develops doctrine, leads training requirements analysis provides a globally distributed and interoperable training environment
 - J9-Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate
 - JCOA-Joint Center for Operational Analysis collects, analyzes and disseminates lessons learned and best practices
- Other Elements (other organizations provide unique knowledge and capabilities for JFCOM as it works on its daily mission: JFCOM has become a catch-all):
 - Joint Systems Integration Center (JSIC), Suffolk, Va.
 - Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), Norfolk, Va.
 - Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC), Dahlgren, Va.
 - Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), MacDill AFB, Fla.

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- Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE), Suffolk, Va.
- Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), Ft. Belvoir, Va. and Fairchild AFB, Wash.
- Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC), Fort Eustis, Va.
- Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT), Eglin AFB, Fla.
- Special Operations Command - Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), Norfolk, Va.
- Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JEC), Suffolk, Va.

Five Major Themes

HRMFFA's lobbyist, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, have provided us with:

1. **Theme:** Pentagon has skirted Title 10 of the U.S. Code established to ensure Congress has sufficient time to review DoD proposals to close or realign military installations. (*where's the transparency?*)
Impact: Every member of Congress, especially those with military installations in their district, should recognize the infringement on congressional oversight, the threat to their own bases and work together to overturn this action.
2. **Theme:** Pentagon did not sufficiently analyze this decision, conduct a serious ROI analysis, analysis –of-alternatives, or even take the time to visit and receive briefings from the command. (*where's the analysis?*)
Impact: Pentagon may have woefully underestimated the cost to move missions elsewhere, terminate leases, move personnel and re-hire a certain amount of contractor support in the new locations – no action may be taken before a proper study has been conducted and reviewed by Congress.
3. **Theme:** Pentagon did not take into account the impact of ongoing operations. Declaring mission-accomplished to jointness is short-sighted and reckless. The failure to consider impacts to NATO Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT) and Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) is a major misstep. (*in Fall 2009, French 4-Star Gen. Abrial took over at NATO ACT, the first time the command was split from the JFCOM commanding officer*)
Impact: Jointness is not a destination – you never fully arrive – tactics, techniques and procedures change and skills must be constantly honed. The synergy that exists between JFCOM, NATO and JFSC is now at risk.
4. **Theme:** The President may be approving the potential elimination of 10,000 high-technology jobs in the midst of the Great Recession. (*political argument*)
Impact: Obama won 53% - 47% in Virginia – the Commonwealth is not a given for Obama and democratic incumbent Members of Congress.

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5. **Theme:** JFCOM is a nation-wide organization, not a Suffolk/Norfolk command – many Members of Congress will feel the impacts of a closure.
(colleague argument)

Impact: Significant job and mission impacts throughout Virginia, State of Washington, Florida and Nevada.

There are JFCOM allies beyond Hampton Roads:

- Members of Congress representing other COCOMs, e.g. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), etc.
- Selected Members of Congress with defense equities that could be perceived as vulnerable or threatened by Pentagon’s focus on eliminating contractors:
 - School houses
 - Training and Education (T&E) facilities
 - Depots & Industrial
 - Headquarters & Support
 - Defense Agencies
- Support “Dear Colleague” letter started by VA delegation *(if this can happen in Hampton Roads, it could happen in your district)*
- Assist in identifying key offices and harnessing their support

Member	JFCOM Org	Location	Committee Assignment	Support to:
Sen Murray	JPRA	Fairchild AFB, Spokane, Wash.	SAC-D	Sen Inouye
Sen Cantwell	JPRA	Fairchild AFB, Spokane, Wash.		
Rep McMorris-Rogers	JPRA	Fairchild AFB, Spokane, Wash.	HASC	Rep Skelton
Rep Moran	JPRA	Ft. Belvoir, Va.	HAC-D	Rep Dicks
Sen Nelson	JFIIT/JCSE	Eglin AFB, Fla.	SASC	Sen Levin

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Sen LeMieux	JFIIT/JCSE	Eglin AFB, Fla.	SASC	Sen McCain
Rep Castor	JFIIT/JCSE	MacDill AFB, Fla.	Democratic Steering and Policy	Rep Pelosi
Sen Reid	JUASCE	Creech AFB, Nev.	Majority Leader	
Sen Ensign	JUASCE	Creech AFB, Nev.	Homeland Sec	Sen Lieberman
Rep Heller	JUASCE	Creech AFB, Nev.	Ways & Means	Reps Camp, Cantor

SAC-D, Senate Appropriations Committee – Defense

HASC, House Armed Services Committee

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SASC, Senate Armed Services Committee

JUASCE, Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence

Next Steps

- **Make this a Congressional Battle, not just a Virginia Skirmish**
 - Engage Congressional leadership: Reid/Pelosi; Levin/Skelton; Inouye/Obey/Dick: *why?* DoD is overstepping their authority and threatening Congressional oversight
 - Pentagon is making it harder for the White House to retain 2nd District
- **Directly engage the White House: President (POTUS), Chief of Staff, Office of Management & Budget (OMB)**
 - Sec. Gates rolled this out on 8-9-10 with no advance warning, issued a formal tasking on 8-16-10 then went on vacation
 - Gov. McDonnell has requested sit-down meeting with POTUS
 - Impact to employment in VA may be unknown to White House
 - VA is a highly contested state and a given for only a few “safe” seats
 - President’s commitment to transparency and to national defense will be questioned by this decision
- **Develop Legislative Allies**
 - Brief Members/staff who have JFCOM employees in their districts
 - Ask them to engage committee/caucus leadership and to support our legislative proposals

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Summary

- JFCOM holds an “All Hands” today to brief command’s leadership (20Aug10)
- POTUS approval expected Sep 1st
- Congress reconvenes Sep 13th (*after the deal is done?*)
- JFCOM’s Gen Mattis replacement, Gen Odierno, reports Oct 29th and has “9-12 months to work himself out of a job”
- Defense Task Force report due by Dec 14th; headed by Robert Rangel
- Implementation plan activities start Jan 2011; complete by Sep 2011
- Other:
 - J7-Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center probably survives in some context but somewhere other than Hampton Roads
 - Elimination of the Second Fleet is in question; headquartered in Norfolk with a jointness mission to build and maintain maritime partnerships prior to crises occurring.

WHAT CAN YOU DO?

On advice from HRMFFA’s consultants, the region’s political leadership are encouraged to engage now and communicate to White House the region’s wholesale discontent with the proceedings and to work through mitigation of closing JFCOM politically. Any data or analysis collected over the period prior to SECDEF Gates announcement was done behind closed doors with Gen Mattis knowledge and involvement.

- Chief of Staff:
 - Rahm Emanuel; remanuel@who.eop.gov; 202-456-6798
- Intergovernmental Affairs office:
 - Valerie Jarrett, vjarrett@who.eop.gov, 202-456-1097
 - Cecilia Munoz, cmunoz@who.eop.gov, 202-456-1097
 - Patrick Gaspard, pgaspard@who.eop.gov, 202-456-6257

Snapshot of JFCOM

	ACTIVITY	Military Strength							Civilian Strength			Mil/Civ Total		Contractor Strength	Total Force Strength
		Current Manning					Proj Manning		JTD CIV AUTH	CURR ASGN**	CIV MAN%	JUN 10 AD MIL/CIV ASGN	Proj DEC 10 MIL/CIV ASGN	CURR CONTR	JUN 10 TOTAL FORCE
		JUN 10 JTD AD AUTH	JUN 10 AD ASGN	JUN 10 AD MAN	JUN 10 RC ASGN*	JUN 10 AD & RC MAN%	Proj DEC 10 AD ASGN	Proj DEC 10 AD MAN%							
Above The Line (ATL) Management Headquarters Activity	J00***	45	51	113%	2	118%	41	91%	26	22	85%	106%	92%	3	78
	J01***	5	5	100%	0	100%	5	100%	2	2	100%	100%	100%	0	7
	J02***	30	49	163%	4	177%	30	100%	89	75	84%	108%	92%	35	163
	J1	13	14	108%	0	108%	12	92%	36	28	78%	86%	82%	6	48
	J2/JIOC****	0	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	24	2400%	2500%	2500%	0	25
	J34 & Joint Interoperability Division (JID)	43	47	109%	11	135%	37	86%	51	39	76%	103%	93%	99	196
	J5 / WLO / JFG / LNO	18	18	100%	0	100%	13	72%	35	38	109%	106%	96%	10	66
	J6	17	22	129%	1	135%	19	112%	39	54	138%	138%	132%	0	77
	J7/JTD	4	3	75%	5	200%	2	50%	0	0	0%	200%	175%	0	8
	J8	7	7	100%	2	129%	6	86%	4	4	100%	118%	109%	0	13
	J9/JCD&E	8	6	75%	1	88%	4	50%	1	1	100%	89%	67%	0	8
JRD	10	7	70%	3	100%	8	80%	0	0	0%	100%	110%	0	10	
ATL SUB-TOTAL	200	229	115%	30	130%	177	89%	284	287	101%	113%	102%	153	699	
Below The Line (BTL) Joint Subordinate Activity	Joint Force Provider	61	56	92%	0	92%	56	92%	44	43	98%	94%	94%	0	99
	J2/JIOC****	107	111	104%	0	104%	92	86%	114	99	87%	95%	86%	221	220
	J6/Enterprise Management (EM)	45	32	71%	0	71%	35	78%	65	22	34%	49%	52%	189	243
	J7/JTD	217	156	72%	17	80%	145	67%	238	148	62%	71%	68%	1238	1559
	J8/Joint Capability Development (JCD)	18	13	72%	2	83%	13	72%	123	96	78%	79%	79%	216	327
	J9/JCD&E	37	28	76%	0	76%	24	65%	190	106	56%	59%	57%	353	487
	JCOA	33	27	82%	3	91%	21	64%	27	23	85%	88%	78%	104	157
	JCSE	395	428	108%	47	120%	348	88%	20	29	145%	121%	102%	0	504
	JDTC	9	7	78%	0	78%	5	56%	1	1	100%	80%	60%	74	73
	JECC	82	51	62%	4	67%	53	65%	18	19	106%	74%	76%	78	77
	JRIT	33	28	85%	0	85%	25	76%	22	11	50%	71%	65%	134	134
	JIWC	4	6	150%	1	175%	5	125%	17	14	82%	100%	95%	37	36
	JPASE	26	20	77%	0	77%	18	69%	22	19	86%	81%	77%	13	12
	JPra	40	32	80%	0	80%	23	58%	116	95	82%	81%	76%	311	311
	JSIC	20	12	60%	0	60%	13	65%	50	39	78%	73%	74%	128	128
	JUAS COE	38	22	58%	0	58%	26	68%	6	4	67%	59%	68%	32	31
	JWAC	60	48	80%	0	80%	42	70%	519	494	95%	94%	93%	0	542
	NAT O SCHOOL	29	29	100%	0	100%	29	100%	11	11	100%	100%	100%	0	40
SOCJFCOM	80	55	69%	1	70%	57	71%	32	18	56%	66%	68%	49	49	
BTL SUB-TOTAL	1334	1161	87%	75	93%	1030	77%	1635	1291	79%	85%	81%	3177	5029	
GRAND TOTAL	1534	1390	91%	105	97%	1207	79%	1919	1578	82%	89%	84%	3330	5728	

COMMAND LAYDOWN

